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Though people tend to remember emotional information with extreme vividness, this 
vividness often comes at the cost of memory for surrounding information. The goal of 
this dissertation is to investigate this memory trade-off and how it is influenced by 
focused attention, trait anxiety, and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In each study, 
participants were shown composite pictures that included an emotional or neutral item 
placed on a neutral background. Later, they were shown the same items and backgrounds 
separately. A memory trade-off occurred when participants were more likely to 
remember emotional items and forget the associated backgrounds as compared to 
equivalent memory for neutral items and backgrounds. The results from the first chapter 
revealed that the amount of overt visual attention on an emotional item did not predict the 
presence of the memory trade-off. However, when it was task relevant to disengage one’s 
attention from the emotional item, the memory trade-off was dampened. Further, dividing 
attention had no effect on the memory trade-off. The results of the second chapter 
demonstrated that the memory trade-off was enhanced for emotional items with high 
levels of arousal as compared to low arousal items. This enhancement was especially 
strong for individuals with high trait anxiety, when this information was negative and 
arousing, and when the scene was remembered with a sense of familiarity. Further, for 
items and backgrounds that were vividly recollected, individuals with higher levels of 
anxiety were less likely to be able to modulate the memory trade-off, even when it was 
task relevant to attend to background information. The third chapter revealed that people 
with PTSD have a larger memory trade-off for both positive and negative information, 
despite the lack of overall item memory differences. These studies reveal that attention 
may not be the only factor that influences the memory trade-off and that the memory 
trade-off may be influenced by trait anxiety and PTSD. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Emotional items tend to be remembered with enhanced vividness. Although emotional 
items are sometimes remembered along with elements of their context (e.g., Brown & Kulik, 
1977; Doerksen & Shimamura, 2001), the enhanced memory for emotional items often comes at 
a cost of memory for surrounding visual elements (Brown, 2003; Burke, Heuer, & Reisberg, 
1992; Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 2007; Levine & Edelstein, 2009; Safer, 
Christianson, Autry, & Osterlund, 1998; Strange, Hurleman, & Dolan, 2003). Within 
investigations of eyewitness memory, this kind of phenomenon has also been described as the 
“weapon focus effect,” referring to the fact that crime victims are more likely to remember the 
emotional object (the weapon) but not other surrounding visual details such as their robber’s face 
or clothing (Brown, 2003; Deffenbacher, 1983; Pickel, French, & Betts, 2003; Shaw & Skolnick, 
1994). 
More broadly, this effect has been referred to as the emotion-induced memory trade-off 
(Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, et al., 2007; Waring, Payne, Schacter, & Kensinger, 2010). A number 
of different laboratory studies have found that when an emotional item is present in a complex 
visual scene, people are more likely to remember that item, but are also more likely to forget the 
surrounding visual elements (Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, et al., 2007; Kensinger, Gutchess & 
Schacter, 2007; Payne, Stickgold, Swanberg & Kensinger, 2008; Waring et al., 2008).  
Attention and the Memory Trade-off 
Though the presence of these memory trade-offs have been shown to be a robust effect, it is 
still unclear what mechanism is driving this phenomenon. Most have assumed that attention at 
encoding may be one factor that causes memory trade-offs (see Reisberg & Heuer, 2004). Our 
environment contains more information than we can process simultaneously, requiring us to 
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selectively attend to only a fraction of the information in our world. Because we cannot attend to 
all of the information that surrounds us, emotional information is often prioritized. We are more 
likely to notice emotional information and process it (see Dolan & Vuilleumier, 2003 for 
review); we are also less likely to disengage our attention from it in order to process less salient 
surrounding stimuli (e.g., Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004; Sarter, Givens & 
Bruno, 2001).  Further, high arousal stimuli may lead to the narrowing of attention (Easterbrook, 
1959). This attentional prioritization and focus may lead to decreased encoding of surrounding 
information and a memory trade-off. However, the extent to which deployment and maintenance 
of attentional resources influences the memory trade-off has not been systematically examined. 
The first chapter of this dissertation examines the hypothesis that focused attention influences the 
emotion-induced memory trade-off. 
Anxiety and the Memory Trade-off 
It is not fully understood how individual differences in trait anxiety may influence the 
memory trade-off. People with high levels of trait anxiety are more likely to attend to emotional 
information and have difficulty disengaging their attention from the emotional information (see 
Mogg & Bradley, 1999). Though the results of studies on the effects of anxiety on memory have 
been mixed, at least in some cases, individuals that are higher in trait anxiety may be more likely 
to remember threatening emotional information (see Eysenck, & Mogg, 1992 for review). It is 
possible that only some studies have found memory biases for those with high anxiety because 
people with higher levels of anxiety may be more likely to exhibit a memory trade-off, 
remembering the emotional parts, but forgetting surrounding details.  This could lead to 
seemingly contradictory findings in the literature based on the type of stimuli that are studied.  
For example, if people with higher levels of anxiety are asked about their memory for details 
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about the emotional component of the scene, they may exhibit better memory than those with 
lower levels of anxiety.  However, if the memory test focuses on more contextual details of the 
scene, memory enhancement may not be revealed for those with higher anxiety.  In support of 
this hypothesis, one study found that the level of anxiety in a sub-clinical population was 
correlated with the magnitude of the memory trade-off effect (Waring, et al., 2010).  In other 
words, people with higher levels of anxiety were more likely to remember the emotional 
component of a scene and to forget the neutral background (i.e. exhibiting a larger memory 
trade-off) than were people with lower anxiety levels. The second chapter of this dissertation 
examines the hypothesis that trait anxiety may affect the magnitude of the emotion-induced 
memory trade-off. 
PTSD and the Memory Trade-off 
Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is an anxiety disorder that develops in response to a 
traumatic event (Breslau, 2002).  It is characterized by automatic re-experiencing of the trauma 
(e.g., flashbacks), avoiding situations associated with the trauma, numbing of responsiveness and 
affect, and hypervigilance, or increased sensitivity to detecting threat (APA, 2000). Further, 
some research has indicated that people with PTSD have fragmented and disjointed memories of 
their trauma, even when they voluntarily recall them (Foa, Molnar, & Cashman, 1995; Halligan, 
Michael, Clark & Ehlers, 2003; Nijenhuis & van der Hart, 1999; Tromp, Koss, Figueredo & 
Tharan, 1995; van der Hart, van der Kolk, & Boon, 1998; van der Kolk and Fisler, 1995). Many 
of these cognitive symptoms seem to indicate possible differences in attentional processing 
towards stimuli associated with their trauma, and perhaps to emotional stimuli more generally.  
However, few studies have focused on differences in emotional memory, beyond memory just 
for stimuli associated with the traumatic event. Further, though we know that people with PTSD 
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have missing pieces of information from their trauma memories, it is unclear if this 
fragmentation is linked to the memory trade-off, as this hypothesis has not been examined. 
Chapter 3 of the dissertation explores the hypothesis that the memory trade-off may be greater in 
individuals with PTSD than those without PTSD, despite overall group differences in memory 
for positive and negative stimuli. 
The Current Studies 
In the first chapter I investigated the effect of attention on the memory trade-off in three 
ways. First, eye-tracking analyses were used in order to examine the effect of overt visual 
attention at encoding on the memory trade-off at retrieval. Because emotionally arousing stimuli 
at encoding may attract and narrow attention, leading to decreased processing of surrounding 
information (e.g., Dolan & Vuilleumier, 2003; Easterbrook, 1959), I hypothesized that more 
attention on the emotional item at encoding would lead to a greater memory trade-off.  
Second, the relative salience of emotional items and background contexts was 
manipulated by asking participants to selectively attend to one or the other in order to 
successfully answer true/false questions. This allowed me to investigate the ability to disengage 
attentional resources from emotional items which usually naturally capture attention. In line with 
previous research that has suggested individuals can modulate the strength of the memory trade-
off when instructed to attend to non-emotional details of the scene (Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, et 
al, 2007), I hypothesized that participants would be able to disengage their attention from 
emotional items to process the background. This would serve to dampen the memory trade-off.  
Third, I examined the effects of limiting attentional resources through a divided attention 
task. Because previous research has indicated that divided attention, or limiting attentional 
resources, may cause people to have a more narrowed focus of attention on negative arousing 
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information (Kern, Libkuman, Otani & Holmes, 2005), I hypothesized that participants would 
have a greater trade-off under divided attention than under full attention. 
The second chapter focuses on understanding the influence of trait anxiety on the 
memory trade-off. First, I examined the effect of valence (positive/pleasant vs. 
negative/unpleasant information) and arousal (exciting/agitating vs. calming/soothing 
information). Because previous studies have shown that people with high trait anxiety may be 
more likely to attend to negative high arousal information (see Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, 
Bakermans-Kranenberg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007; Eysenck & Mogg, 1992), I hypothesized that 
people with high levels of trait anxiety would exhibit a larger memory trade-off for negative high 
arousal information than for positive or low arousal information. Second, I examined the ability 
of individuals with high anxiety to allocate attentional resources when encoding complex 
emotional scenes. Because previous studies have indicated that people with high levels of trait 
anxiety may have difficulty disengaging their attention from emotional information (see Mogg & 
Bradley, 1999), I hypothesized that people with high levels of trait anxiety would be unable to 
eliminate the memory trade-off even when it was task relevant to process the surrounding 
information.  
The third chapter focuses on emotional memory and the memory trade-off in individuals 
with PTSD. First, I examined memory for emotional stimuli in people with PTSD. Because some 
studies have found that people with PTSD may be no more likely to remember traumatic 
information than people without PTSD (Bremner, et al., 2003; Dickie, Brunet, Akerib, & 
Armony, 2008), I first hypothesized that regardless of whether individuals had PTSD or were 
healthy controls, they would have similar memory for negative and positive items. Second, I 
examined the emotional memory trade-off in individuals with PTSD. Because people with PTSD 
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have reported “tunnel memory” or fragmented memory for their trauma (LaBar, 2007), I 
hypothesized that people with PTSD would exhibit a greater memory trade-off than those 
without PTSD. 
CHAPTER 1: EFFECTS OF ATTENTION ON THE MEMORY TRADE-OFF  
It has often been suggested that the emotion-induced memory trade-off is influenced by 
focused attention on emotional items at encoding (see Reisberg & Heuer, 2004 for review). The 
rationale behind this idea is based on the fact that high arousal emotional items tend to be 
prioritized for processing; they are more likely to be detected and to provoke sustained attention 
(Christianson, 1992; Dolan & Vuilleumier, 2003; Easterbrook, 1959; Shimmack, 2005). These 
effects of emotion in capturing attention may influence the emotion-induced memory trade-off 
by biasing attention at encoding, leading to a detailed memory for the emotional component, but 
not for the surrounding scene.  Participants may be more likely to encode those components of 
the scene and to later remember them, as opposed to the neutral background components that 
were not prioritized at encoding.  
However, the influence of attention on the memory trade-off has yet to be systematically 
tested. The current chapter investigates the role of attention in three different ways: by 
examining eye gaze as a measure of overt visual attention (Experiment 1), by examining the 
effect of attentional disengagement (Experiment 1) and by examining the effect of divided 
attention (Experiment 2) on the emotion-induced memory trade-off. 
Many studies have provided evidence for the prioritization of emotional information as 
the focus of attention. People are quicker to notice emotional information within a visual array 
(Ohman, Flykt & Esteves, 2001), are more likely to notice emotional than neutral words that are 
presented very quickly (Anderson & Phelps, 2001), and are more susceptible to interference by 
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emotional distracters than neutral distracters (McKenna & Sharma, 1995; Shimmack, 2005). 
These effects of emotion on attention have also been shown in studies that have investigated eye 
gaze as a measure of overt visual attention. People tend to fixate first and look longer at 
emotional pictures than neutral pictures when emotional and neutral pictures are presented side 
by side or when emotional pictures are presented as distracters (Bannerman, Milders & Sahraie, 
2009; Calvo & Lang, 2004; Nummenmaa, Hyönä, & Calvo, 2006). Thus, attention may initially 
be focused on emotional information, and it may be harder for participants to disengage attention 
from that information. 
The influence of attention at encoding on the weapon focus effect was investigated by 
Loftus, Loftus & Messo (1987). In this study, participants’ eye gaze was monitored while they 
were presented with slides in which a person entered a bank with either a gun or a check. This 
study found that people made more fixations on the gun than on the check when viewing the 
slides. In addition, memory for surrounding elements in the “weapon” condition was poorer than 
in the “check” condition. This is compelling evidence that attention at encoding may be allocated 
differently depending on the presence of an emotional item. However, this study looked at eye 
gaze and memory results separately and did not directly relate eye gaze and memory. In other 
words, there was no indication that the increased fixation on the weapon at encoding was what 
led to an increased likelihood of the weapon focus effect in memory. Therefore, it is still unclear 
if there is a causal link between attention allocation at encoding and the memory trade-off and if 
so, whether it extends to positive as well as negative emotional stimuli or if it is specific to 
negative threat-related stimuli such as weapons.  
It is also unclear if the emotion-induced memory trade-off is influenced solely by the 
effects of attention prioritization or if difficulty in disengaging one’s attention from emotional 
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items to process surrounding elements may also influence the trade-off. As mentioned 
previously, people attend longer to emotional information (Calvo & Lang, 2004; Nummenmaa, 
et al., 2006) and are less likely to be able to disengage attention from emotional information 
(Koster, et al., 2004; Sarter, et al., 2001). This difficulty in disengaging attention may or may not 
be under volitional control. Nummenmaa et al. (2006) found that participants looked longer at 
emotional pictures even when they were told not to. However, Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, & 
Schacter (2007) found that by varying encoding instructions to direct attention towards 
backgrounds in scenes that included emotional items, young adults were able to dampen the 
emotion-induced memory trade-off (e.g., were more likely to remember the neutral background 
paired with an emotional item). Thus, difficulty in disengaging attention from emotional items 
may influence the emotion-induced memory trade-off, but one may be able to overcome this 
tendency when it is task relevant. 
 If attention at encoding influences the emotion-induced memory trade-off, a remaining 
question is what will happen if only limited attentional resources are available. Some divided 
attention studies looking at differences in memory for negative and neutral pictures have found 
that memory for negative information is enhanced as compared to neutral information, even 
when attention is divided at encoding (Harris & Pashler, 2005; Hulse, Allan, Memon & Read, 
2007). Other divided attention studies have found that dividing attention may actually be less 
likely to decrease memory for negative items than that of positive or neutral information (Kern et 
al., 2005; Talmi, Schimmack, Paterson & Moscovitch, 2007). However, these studies have not 
considered the memory trade-off (e.g., memory for both the item and the background). In the 
current study, I hypothesized that the prioritization of emotional information in concert with 
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limited attention may lead to a larger memory trade-off: increased strength of item memory at 
the expense of the background memory.  
The present study tested these effects of attention at encoding on the emotion-induced 
memory trade-off. Specifically, I examined the effect of overt visual attention (eye gaze) on the 
emotion-induced memory trade-off (Experiment 1A), the effect of controlled attentional 
disengagement on eye gaze and the emotion-induced memory trade-off (Experiment 1B), and the 
effect of divided attention on the emotion-induced memory trade-off (Experiment 2).  
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. Data from forty-three Boston College students (ages 18-21, 22 men) were 
analyzed for this study. For four of the participants, no eye-tracking data was collected due to 
eye-tracker malfunction (though they completed the task with the eye-tracker set up in the same 
way as the other participants). Therefore, for the behavioral analyses all forty-three participants 
are included and for the eye-tracking analyses, thirty-nine participants are included (ages 18-21, 
21 men). Participants included in the analyses for this study were a subset of those tested as part 
of a larger study examining individual differences in anxiety levels (see Chapter 2). The 
participants included in the present analyses were those who had a Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI-II) (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) score under ten and a Beck Anxiety 
Inventory (BAI) (Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988) score under nineteen.  These cutoffs 
were chosen according to normative data to exclude BDI scores at or above the ninety-ninth 
percentile (i.e., a cut-off score of 10, Knight, 1984) and BAI scores at or above the ninetieth 
percentile (i.e., a cut-off score of 19, Gillis, Haaga & Ford, 1995). The anxiety score cutoff was 
deliberately more conservative (i.e., excluded a greater proportion of participants) to make sure 
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that the high anxiety participants recruited as part of the larger sample were not included. All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were native English speakers, and had no 
history of a neuropsychological or psychiatric disorder.  No participant listed that he or she was 
taking medications that affect the central nervous system. 
 
Materials. Stimuli consisted of complex visual scenes that were created by placing images of 
positive, negative and neutral items onto neutral background scenes (See Figure 1, “Study” 
Panel). The stimulus set included objects and backgrounds used in prior studies (Kensinger, 
Garoff-Eaton, et al., 2007; Waring & Kensinger, 2009; Waring, et al., 2010). Composite images 
Figure 1. Samples of the composite study stimuli (a negative, neutral or positive item on a 
neutral background), the recognition test stimuli (the item and background presented 
separately), and the area of interest selection for the eye-tracking analyses.	  
Study 
Samples 
Test 
Samples 
Area of Interest 
Selection Sample 
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were created by placing an item onto a plausible background scene. Care was taken to make sure 
that positive, negative, and neutral objects were of comparable size and were placed in the same 
approximate location across scenes.  Each picture was approximately 10x13 in. and 700x550 
pixels. 
Items were 180 nameable, photographic-quality, color images that were taken from photo 
clip art packages (Hemera Technologies, Quebec, Canada), from the International Affective 
Picture System (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999) and from other online databases of images.  
The pictures were broken down by valence according to ratings gathered in previous studies (and 
confirmed by ratings collected in Experiment 2). Valence was rated on a 9-point scale with 9 
being the most positive and 1 being the most negative.  There were 60 positive images (mean 
valence = 6.02, SE = .81), 60 negative images (mean valence = 3.80, SE = .82) and 60 neutral 
images (mean valence = 5.29, SE = .75).  Arousal was rated on a 5-point scale, with low numbers 
indicating soothing or subduing images and high numbers indicating exciting or agitating images 
(arousal mean (SD): Positive = 3.02 (0.57); Negative= 3.19 (0.66); Neutral = 2.35 (0.61)). 
Valence was rated on a larger scale than arousal, because while arousal is often divided into two 
categories (high arousal and low arousal), valence is often split into three categories (positive, 
negative, neutral). The positive and negative images were matched on arousal and absolute 
valence (i.e., distance from neutral, all p >.30) and neutral images were considered less arousing 
than both positive and negative images (all p <.05). Across emotion categories, scenes were also 
matched for visual complexity, congruency between item and background, and number of 
people, animals and buildings as judged by two raters. 
Stimuli were split in half to create two different study sets with 90 scenes per list (30 with 
a negative item, 30 with a positive item and 30 with a neutral item).  Those sets were either 
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presented in forward order or in reverse order, yielding four total study lists that were 
counterbalanced across participants. It was never the case that more than three scenes of the 
same emotion category appeared in a row. 
Equipment and Procedure 
The eye-tracking apparatus was a SensoMotoric Instruments (SMI) Eye Tracker. 
Participants’ left eye gaze patterns were tracked at 500 Hz by a SMI iView X Hi-Speed 1250 
tracking column. Prior to the eye-tracking session, participants filled out the consent form, a 
demographics questionnaire, an assessment of their state and trait anxiety and an assessment of 
their depressive symptoms (e.g., the BAI, the BDI-II, and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(STAI [Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983]).  Participants then completed the 
tasks described below. 
Encoding task 1: View Condition. Participants were seated two feet away from a 14 in. 
computer screen, with the center of the computer screen at eye level. Each participant’s eye-gaze 
was first tracked during a calibration phase. For the calibration, participants were asked to shift 
their gaze to each of 17 points on a computer screen to ensure that the eye-tracker was accurately 
tracking the pupil of the left eye. Once calibrated, participants were given the task instructions. 
Participants were asked to look naturally (as if they were watching television) at the screen as 
each picture appeared and to look at a fixation cross in between trials. During this incidental 
encoding session, each trial began with a white fixation cross presented on a black screen for 
4,000 ms. This fixation was followed by the appearance of a composite picture for 5,000 ms. 
After a short practice (3 pictures), the participants viewed 45 pictures (15 from each emotion 
category).  
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Encoding task 2: Attentional Disengagement Condition. Once the first set was 
completed, instructions came up on the screen for the second incidental encoding task. 
Participants were instructed to look at each different complex visual scene carefully while it was 
on the screen (for 5,000 ms). They were then told that after the picture had been removed from 
the screen, two true/false questions would be presented one at a time. Participants were told that 
one true/false statement was about the item in the scene (e.g., “The dog does not have a collar.”) 
and one was about the background (e.g., “There are clouds in the sky.”). Participants gave their 
true or false responses verbally while an experimenter recorded their responses, so that 
participants did not need to remove their gaze from the computer monitor.  
Each participant then completed a short practice version of the encoding task (5 trials) 
and then proceeded to view the next 45 pictures (15 from each emotion category).  The order of 
the encoding tasks was always constant, with the Attentional Disengagement condition 
administered after completion of the View condition, to avoid concerns that answering the 
true/false questions would alter the way in which participants would view and elaborate upon the 
scenes in the View condition. 
Delay and Test Phase. After participants completed both phases of the encoding session, 
a battery of standardized cognitive tasks was administered, creating a retention delay of 
approximately 30 minutes. The tests included: the Shipley Vocabulary Test (Shipley, 1986), 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale Backwards Digit Span Test (Wechsler, 1997), The Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scale Digit Symbol Test (Wechsler, 1997), The FAS Test of verbal fluency 
(Spreen & Benton, 1977) and the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935). 
Following neuropsychological testing, participants were presented with a surprise 
recognition task in which they viewed items and backgrounds extracted from the studied 
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composite scenes in addition to new items and backgrounds.  Images included 90 studied items 
(30 of each valence), 90 studied backgrounds (30 studied with an item of each valence), 90 new 
items (30 of each valence), and 90 new backgrounds, for a total of 360 images (see Figure 1, 
“Test” Panel).  
These items were presented in four different orders (two randomized lists were presented 
either in forward or reverse order), and the order was counterbalanced across participants.  The 
different list orders ensured that the placement of a certain picture in relation to another picture 
did not influence memory across participants (e.g., one item happened to be remembered better 
because of its placement after the corresponding background).  
Half of the studied items and backgrounds from each valence category had been 
presented in the “View” condition and half in the “Attentional Disengagement” condition. The 
particular items and backgrounds that were “old” vs. “new” were counterbalanced across 
participants based on the study list that they viewed. For each item or background, participants 
were asked to indicate whether they believed the picture was new, whether they “remembered” it 
(recollected specific details of its presentation during the encoding session) or “knew” it (felt a 
sense of familiarity with the picture, without remembering details from the encoding session). 
This test was self-paced and the slide moved on when participants had made their response. For 
the behavioral results, all “remember” and “know” responses were collapsed to assess memory 
for all items rated as old.  
A pilot study (N=14) was conducted to assess whether there was any difference in 
memorability for the backgrounds paired with each category of emotional item. This study was 
conducted because it was not possible to fully counterbalance the category of emotional item 
presented with each background (i.e., each background could not always be plausibly presented 
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with a neutral, a negative, and a positive item between subjects). The pilot study revealed that 
there were no differences in memory for any of the backgrounds based on the valence of the item 
that it would be paired with in the study session, mean (SD) hits: positive = 0.82 (0.15), negative 
= 0.80 (0.13), neutral = 0.83 (0.14), all p > 0.28.  
Data Analysis.  
Behavioral Data Analysis. For behavioral memory data, false alarms (new pictures that 
were incorrectly cited as being old) were subtracted from hits (pictures that were correctly 
recognized as being old) in order to correct for any bias to call a picture “old.”  These corrected 
recognition scores were computed separately for each item type (positive, negative, neutral) and 
for each background type. Note that only one false alarm rate could be ascertained for 
backgrounds: by definition new backgrounds are neutral because the emotionality of a 
background relates to the type of item with which it had been studied. 
The memory data were then analyzed to determine the difference in memory for 
emotional items and backgrounds as compared to neutral. The emotion-induced memory trade-
off is defined as the combined increase in memory for emotional items as compared to neutral 
items and decrease in memory for backgrounds accompanying emotional items compared to 
neutral items. Thus, to calculate a memory trade-off score, corrected recognition scores for 
neutral items were subtracted from corrected recognition scores for positive or negative items, 
and corrected recognition scores for backgrounds paired with neutral items were subtracted from 
corrected recognition scores for backgrounds paired with positive or negative backgrounds (see 
Leclerc & Kensinger, 2008; Waring & Kensinger, 2009, for use of these types of difference 
scores).   
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To then calculate the magnitude of the trade-off effect (e.g., the discrepancy between 
item and background memory), these corrected scores for the backgrounds were subtracted from 
the corrected scores for the items. The overall formula was:  
Memory trade-off score =  
(memory for emotional item – memory for neutral item) –  
(memory for background paired with emotional item – memory for background paired with 
neutral item) 
The largest trade-off occurs when there is both better memory for the emotional item and worse 
memory for the accompanying background as compared to neutral (see Waring et al., 2010 for 
use of this composite trade-off score).  
Eye-tracking Data Analysis. For the eye-tracking results, the dependent variable was the 
percentage of scene viewing time that participants spent fixated on the item.  Emotional or 
neutral items within the scene were defined as areas of interest (see Figure 1, “Area of Interest” 
Panel). Fixation percentage was calculated by measuring the amount of time that a participant 
fixated on that predetermined area of interest and dividing that by the total amount of time that 
the participant fixated on any area of the scene.  A fixation was defined as the maintenance of 
eye gaze on a particular point on the screen for 50 ms or more.  As recommended by eye-
tracking software manufacturers, the first fixation for each slide was excluded from the analysis, 
as the first fixation actually reflects the last fixation from the previous trial (i.e., the participant is 
usually still looking where the fixation cross or text was on the previous screen). BeGaze 
software was used to record the appearance and duration of the visual stimuli, as well as 
fixations on the stimuli.  
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The eye-tracking results were analyzed in two different ways. To determine how item 
fixation time was affected by the emotionality of the item, the first analysis considered only item 
fixation time for all correctly remembered items (“hits”) regardless of whether the background 
was remembered or forgotten. The second analysis allowed examination of item fixation time in 
relation to whether there was selective item memory1.  
For this analysis, percent fixation time was considered separately when there was 
selective item memory (e.g., the item was remembered and the background was forgotten) versus 
when there was not selective item memory (e.g., the item was remembered as well as the 
background or the item was forgotten and the background was remembered). Both of these latter 
trial types were collapsed together in order to give sufficient power to estimate the eye gaze 
patterns for the no selective item memory condition.  It should be noted that different trials are 
included in these two analyses because, while the first analysis only includes fixation time for 
item hits, the second analysis also includes times when the item was forgotten as part of the no 
selective item memory condition.  
Results 
Behavioral Results: View Condition 
 First, a t-test was conducted to compare the memory trade-off for positive and negative 
items under the View condition. This t-test revealed no significant difference in trade-off scores 
between positive and negative items, t < .3, p >.7 (see Figure 2 black bars). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The term “selective item memory” is used for these analyses instead of the “emotion-induced 
memory trade-off” because these analyses consider memory for items and backgrounds that are 
neutral as well as emotional. The emotion-induced memory trade-off refers to a specific 
difference in item and background memory for emotional information that differs significantly 
from neutral.	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Eye Gaze Results: View Condition 
To determine how the percent item fixation differed by emotion type, the first eye-
tracking analysis considered percent item fixation at encoding for items that were later 
remembered. A one-way ANOVA revealed a main effect of emotion (positive, negative, neutral; 
F (2,76) = 7.19, p < .01, ηP2 = .159). Subsequent t-tests revealed that a larger percentage of time 
was spent fixating on positive, t (38) = 3.427, p <.01, and negative, t (38) = 3.552, p <.01 items 
than neutral ones. There was no significant difference in fixation time for positive and negative 
items, t < 0.05, p > 0.5 (see Figure 3A, black bars).   
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 In order to determine the relationship between percent item fixation and the emotion-
induced memory trade-off, a second analysis considered item fixation at encoding separately 
depending on the presence or absence of later selective item memory.  Selective item memory 
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occurred when the item was remembered and the background was not, and it was considered not 
to have occurred when either only the background was remembered or both the item and the 
background were remembered.  Scenes for which both item and background components were 
forgotten were not included in these analyses.  Therefore, these second analyses included a 
broader set of the encoding trials than did the first eye-tracking analysis; these second analyses 
included fixation time for all scenes in which any component was remembered, not only those 
scenes in which the item was remembered. I used this broader set of trials to be able to include 
data from the largest subset of participants; there were too few trials for some participants if only 
conditions in which the item was remembered were analyzed. 
In this second analysis, a Selective Item Memory (present, absent) x Emotion (positive, 
negative, neutral) ANOVA was conducted. Thirty-six participants were included in this analysis 
due to missing data (e.g., three participants never exhibited selective item memory for scenes of 
a certain valence). This analysis revealed a main effect of selective item memory, F(1,35) = 
56.271, p <.001, ηP2 =.617, and a main effect of emotion, F(2,70) = 4.028, p < .05, ηP2 = .103, 
but not a valence x selective item memory interaction (F <1.9, p > .15)2. Subsequent t-tests 
revealed that the percent item fixation was greater for scenes in which there was a later selective 
item memory as compared to those in which there was not, t(35) = 6.149, p < .001. The effect of 
emotion was such that people fixated longer on positive items than on negative items, t(35) = 
2.112, p < .05, and marginally longer on positive items than on neutral ones, t(35) = 1.718, p < 
.1. Although there was no emotion x selective item memory interaction, the results suggest that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 There was also no valence x selective item memory interaction when ‘no selective item 
memory’ was defined as times when both the item and background were remembered (instead of 
defining ‘no selective item memory’ as either when only the background was remembered or 
when both the item and background were remembered), although only 33 participants were able 
to be included in this alternate analysis due to missing data.	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the effect of emotion was, if anything, more pronounced when there was not selective item 
memory, with the difference between positive and neutral looking time differing only in that 
condition, t(35) = 2.692, p < .05 and not in the selective item memory condition (t < 1, p > .1; see 
left portion of Figure 3B).  
Behavioral Results: Attentional Disengagement Condition 
In order to examine the effect of the Attentional Disengagement Condition (answering 
the true/false questions about the item and the background), a 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted with 
the factors of valence (positive, negative) x disengagement condition (view, disengagement). 
This analysis revealed a main effect of disengagement, F (1,42) = 7.201, p < .05,  ηP2= .146 (see 
Figure 3). Post hoc t-tests revealed that there was a larger emotion-induced memory trade-off for 
items encoded under the View Condition than those under the Attentional Disengagement 
Condition (t (42) = 2.683, p < .05, see Figure 2).  The difference in the trade-off for positive and 
negative items under the Attentional Disengagement Condition was not significantly greater than 
the item-background trade-off for neutral items (t < .9, p > .38) 
Eye Gaze Results: Attentional Disengagement Condition 
In order to examine the effect of attentional disengagement on the time spent fixating on 
items within scenes, an emotion (positive, negative, neutral) x disengagement condition (view, 
disengagement) ANOVA was conducted (see Figure 3A). This analysis revealed a main effect of 
emotion, F(2,75) = 4.335, p < .05, ηP2 = .102, a marginal main effect of disengagement 
condition, F (1,42) = 3.918, p < .06,  ηP2= .093 and a marginal emotion x disengagement 
condition interaction, F(2,76) = 2.573, p < .09, ηP2 = .063.  
Post hoc t-tests revealed that for negative items, people fixated longer on items encoded 
under the View condition than those under the Attentional Disengagement Condition, t (38) = 
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4.221, p < .001. This effect was also marginally significant for positive items, t (38) = 1.793, p < 
.09 but was not significant for neutral items (t < 1, p > .1). Under the View Condition, there were 
longer fixations for both positive, t (38) = 3.552, p < .01 and negative items, t (38) = 3.427, p < 
.01) than neutral items, and fixation times did not differ for positive and negative items (all t < 
0.5, p > 0.5). There were no significant emotion differences under the Attentional 
Disengagement Condition (all t < .1, p > .2).  
To better understand these effects, and since there were no significant differences 
between fixation time for positive and negative pictures, I collapsed across items of positive and 
negative valence to conduct an ANOVA with factors of emotion (emotional [positive and 
negative collapsed], neutral) and disengagement condition (view, disengagement). This analysis 
revealed a main effect of emotion, F(1,38) = 11.676, p<.01, ηP2 = .235 and an emotion x 
disengagement condition interaction, F(1,38) = 4.604, p<.05, ηP2 = .108, such that there were 
greater item fixation times for emotional items than neutral items under the View Condition, 
t(38) = 4.311, p<.001, but there was no effect of emotion on fixation times in the Attentional 
Disengagement Condition (t<1.5, p>0.1). In other words, participants fixated longer on 
emotional items than neutral ones under the View condition, but not under the disengagement 
condition. 
I then examined whether this effect varied by the presence of selective item memory. An 
emotion (emotional, neutral) x disengagement condition (view, disengagement) x selective item 
memory (present, absent) ANOVA was conducted (see Figure 3B). Only 28 participants could 
be included in this analysis due to missing data (e.g., there were some people who never 
exhibited selective item memory for neutral scenes under the Attentional Disengagement 
Condition). This analysis revealed a main effect of selective item memory, F (1, 27) = 37.99, p < 
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.001, ηP2 = .585 and a main effect of disengagement condition, F (1, 27) = 4.148, p = .052, ηP2 = 
.133. There were longer fixation times for the item when selective item memory occurred, t(27) 
= 5.589, p < .001, and there were longer fixation times for the item under the View condition 
than in the Attentional Disengagement Condition, t(27) = 2.037, p = .052.  
These main effects were qualified by a selective item memory x disengagement condition 
interaction, F (1, 27) = 4.289, p < .05, ηP2 = .137 and by a selective item memory x emotion 
interaction, F (1, 27) = 3.955, p = .057, ηP2 = .128. The selective item memory x attentional 
disengagement interaction was such that the difference in item fixation percentages was 
significantly greater when selective memory would result in the View condition (comparison of 
selective item memory to non-selective memory: t(27) = 6.068, p < .001) than in the Attentional 
Disengagement Condition, t(27) = 3.216, p < .01. In other words, participants looked especially 
long at the item when it was presented under the View Condition and when selective item 
memory occurred.   
The selective item memory x emotion interaction was such that the difference in item 
fixation percentages was significantly greater if there was later selective item memory for neutral 
items (comparison of selective item memory to non-selective memory: t(27) = 5.003, p < .001) 
than for emotional items, t(27) = 3.479, p < .01. In other words, participants looked especially 
long at neutral items if selective item memory occurred. 
Discussion 
The goal of the first experiment was to test the role of attention and attentional 
disengagement in the memory trade-off. These investigations revealed that overt visual attention 
at encoding (measured as item fixation time) did not predict the presence of the emotion-induced 
trade-off. However, attentional disengagement was able to dampen the memory trade-off effect. 
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These results suggest that an attention focus explanation may not be sufficient in order to explain 
why this effect occurs more for emotional items than for neutral items. 
Effects of Overt Visual Attention. I first found that for items later remembered, people 
fixated longer on emotional rather than neutral items. This goes along with previous literature 
that suggests that people attend longer to emotional information than neutral information 
(Bannerman, et al., 2009; Calvo & Lang, 2004; Nummenmaa, et al., 2006). This analysis 
included only item hits. Thus, even though participants remembered all of these items, they still 
looked longer at the emotional items than the neutral items.  The difference in fixation time 
existed even without a difference in subsequent memory for these particular items.  Perhaps for 
the neutral items a certain threshold of attention was crossed such that participants remembered 
rather than forgot these items. The added fixation time for the emotional items may have lead 
emotional item to be remembered more vividly. 
I also investigated differences in eye fixation depending on whether there was later 
selective item memory (the item but not the background was remembered) or no selective item 
memory (the item and the background were remembered or the background but not the item 
were remembered). These analyses indicated that regardless of valence, longer fixation time on 
the item lead to a greater likelihood of having an item-background memory trade-off. This is 
consistent with studies that have indicated that increased fixation time on a certain part of a 
complex scene may lead to better memory for that particular item (Krugman, Fox, Fletcher, 
Fischer & Rojas, 1994).  
These data support the theoretical background that attention at encoding can influence 
what is remembered. However, the data also revealed that attention during encoding did not lead 
to a more pronounced selective benefit for emotional items than for neutral items (i.e., to the 
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emotion-induced memory trade-off).  In other words, there was no emotion x valence interaction, 
and, as can be seen in Figure 3B, the disparity in fixation times between the emotional and 
neutral items presented in the View Condition was greater when there was not a selective item 
memory effect.  These results suggest that, although people both fixate longer on emotional 
items than on neutral items and also show a more pronounced selective-memory effect for the 
emotional items, there is not a causal relation between these two factors. 
As mentioned in the introduction, Loftus et al. (1987) found that when eye gaze and 
memory data were considered separately, participants both looked longer at weapons than a 
neutral stimulus (a check) and also were more likely to remember weapons at the expense of the 
surrounding information. The current study found similar results when the eye gaze data and 
memory data were considered separately, but overt visual attention (eye gaze) did not seem to be 
the dominant predictor of whether an emotion-induced trade-off would occur. This might be 
because other factors, besides attention at encoding, are playing a role to enhance the emotion-
induced memory trade-off. These possible factors, such as increased post-stimulus processing for 
emotional items, will be discussed in detail in the general discussion of this chapter. 
It is interesting to note that there was some suggestion that positive items were fixated 
upon longer than negative or neutral items, when both item hits and item misses were 
considered.  There is some evidence that attention at encoding can account for the memory 
enhancement for positive information more than negative information (Talmi, et al., 2007). Thus, 
it may be worthwhile for future research to more closely examine whether there is a more 
dominant role for overt attention at encoding in eliciting a trade-off for positive stimuli than for 
negative stimuli.  Other factors, such as post-encoding elaboration, may be more likely to drive 
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the emotion-induced memory trade-off for negative items (and see Libkuman, Stabler, & Otani, 
2004), while increased attention at encoding may play a larger role for positive items. 
Effects of Attentional Disengagement.  The goal of the Attentional Disengagement 
Condition for Experiment 1 was to determine if people are able to disengage their attention from 
emotional information and if this change in attention may be linked to differences in the 
emotion-induced memory trade-off. The results revealed that when asked true/false questions 
about both the background and the item people were more likely to direct their overt visual 
attention towards the background. In addition, the memory scores show that there was less of an 
emotion-induced memory trade-off for the pictures under the Attentional Disengagement 
Condition. This seems to indicate that attentional disengagement may be related to the strength 
of the emotion-induced memory trade-off.  
This also suggests that there is some amount of volitional control such that when it is task 
relevant, people are able to disengage their attention from emotional items to some extent. This 
idea is consistent with Levine and Edelstein’s (2009) suggestion that the emotion-induced 
memory trade-off may be due to emotion’s enhancement of memory for information that is 
relevant to one’s current goals. 
The participants in this study may have been able to dampen the memory trade-off by 
using cognitive control abilities. One indication that a certain level of executive function comes 
from a study in which people who had less cognitive control ability were less able to dampen the 
memory trade-off. Kensinger, Gutchess, & Schacter (2007) varied encoding instructions for 
younger and older adults by asking them to tell a story that incorporated all of the elements or the 
scene, or answer questions about both the item and the background. Here, executive control was 
moderated by using two different age groups since older adults have weaker executive control 
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abilities than younger adults (Braver & Barch, 2002; Gutchess et al., 2007).  This study found 
that younger, but not older, adults were more likely to be able to dampen the trade-off when it 
was task relevant. Thus, a certain level of cognitive control ability may be necessary in order to 
process both the emotional item and the background. Indeed, Waring et al. (2010) found that 
even within a young adult population, decreased cognitive control ability was positively 
correlated with the emotion-induced memory trade-off. In other words, people who had lower 
cognitive control ability were more likely to have a greater emotion-induced memory trade-off 
even under passive viewing conditions. Thus, when it is task relevant in order to correctly 
answer the true/false questions, participants may have used cognitive control to process both the 
emotional items and backgrounds and dampen the emotion-induced memory trade-off. 
The original motivation for the divided attention study was based upon the hypothesis 
that attention drives the memory trade-off. We now have seen that attention does not predict the 
memory trade-off. However, dividing attention may place a fundamentally different burden on 
the attentional system than is measured in analyses of overt visual attention without any 
additional cognitive load. If the use of executive control processes are important for the memory 
trade-off, dividing attention may still play a role by taxing cognitive control processes. Cognitive 
control processes may be necessary to process both items and backgrounds and to continue to 
elaborate on items and backgrounds equally.  Thus, it is possible that when these cognitive 
control processes are taxed, there may be a greater memory trade-off. On the other hand, because 
attention does not predict the memory trade-off, it is also possible that dividing attention may not 
enhance the memory trade-off. The second experiment taxed participants’ cognitive control and 
attentional processes via a divided attention study to directly test these competing hypotheses. 
 
	   28	  
Experiment 2: Divided Attention Study 
Method 
Participants. Data from forty-two Boston College students (ages 18-22, 20 male), 
meeting the criteria outlined for Experiment 1 were analyzed for this study. As in Experiment 1, 
participants included in the analyses for this study were a subset of those tested as part of a larger 
study examining individual differences in anxiety levels (see Chapter 2).  
Stimuli. Stimuli were a larger subset of pictures than used for Experiment 1 in order to 
confirm previous ratings for the emotional pictures by the current participants. Valence was rated 
on a 9-point scale and arousal was rated on a 5-point scale as described for Experiment 1.  There 
were 80 positive images (valence = 5.92 [.90], arousal = 2.37 [.72]), 80 negative images (valence 
= 3.82[1.02], arousal = 3.78 [.77]), and 60 neutral images (mean valence = 5.18 (.90), arousal = 
2.29 (0.64)). Stimuli were split to create three different study lists with 100 items per list (80 
negative, 80 positive and 40 neutral).  Those lists were then also presented in reverse order, 
yielding six total study lists that were counterbalanced across participants. It was never the case 
that more than three of the same emotion category appeared in a row. 
At test, composite scenes from the study sessions were broken down into the isolated 
item and background components and these two elements were shown independently in the 
recognition memory test, just as in Experiment 1. The studied items and backgrounds were 
mixed with new non-studied lures to yield a total of 300 items and 300 backgrounds at test. Two 
different, randomized list orders were created to make the first two test lists. The second two test 
lists were the same as the first two lists only presented in reverse order. This yielded a total of 
four test lists. These test lists were counterbalanced across participants. In addition, items and 
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backgrounds which were “old” vs. “new” were counterbalanced across participants by switching 
the study list that they viewed. 
From all of the pictures used in this study, only a subset of pictures was used in the 
analyses. This subset was chosen so that the positive and negative images were matched on 
arousal and absolute valence (all p>.05) and neutral images were considered less arousing than 
both positive and negative images both for the predetermined ratings and the ratings from the 
participants in this experiment. Across emotion categories, scenes were also matched for visual 
complexity, congruency between item and background, and number of people, animals and 
buildings. The subset of pictures used for analyses were 55 positive (valence = 6.06 [1.15], 
arousal = 2.99 [.58]), 55 negative pictures (valence = 3.64 [1.35], arousal = 3.19 [.68]) and 59 
neutral pictures (valence = 5.31 [.92], arousal = 2.37 [.62]). 
Procedure. Just as in Experiment 1, participants first filled out the consent and payment 
form, a demographics questionnaire, an assessment of their state and trait anxiety (STAI-S and 
STAI-T) and an assessment of their depressive symptoms (BDI-II). 
 Encoding Tasks. Participants completed two incidental encoding tasks: a full attention 
task and a divided attention task. For both tasks, participants saw each image for 5 seconds and 
were asked to rate the picture’s valence on a 9-point scale (9 being intensely positive and 1 being 
intensely negative) while viewing the scene.  After the 5 seconds, the picture went off the screen 
and the participant was asked to press the space bar to move onto the next picture. For half of the 
pictures, presented with the full attention instructions, this was their only task.  
In the divided attention condition, participants performed a second task while rating the 
pictures. Participants listened to two different 1.5 sec auditory patterns (created using Sound 
Edit; MacroMedia, Inc., San Francisco, CA) while they viewed the pictures. These two different 
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patterns changed randomly throughout the task. The participants were asked to press the space 
bar if the pattern changed from pattern A to pattern B or vice versa. The order of the full 
attention and the divided attention conditions was counterbalanced across participants, with some 
participants doing the divided attention task first and some doing the full attention task first.  
Before beginning each task, participants completed a short practice with five trials.  
Delay and test phase. After participants completed the encoding session, a variety of 
standardized cognitive tasks were administered, creating a retention delay of approximately 30 
minutes (Stroop, Backward Digit Span, FAS, Shipley, Digit Symbol).  The delay and test phases 
were the same as in Experiment 1. Also as in Experiment 1, “remember” and “know” responses 
were collapsed for the current analyses, see Appendix A for the discussion of the significant 
“remember” responses. 
Results 
To examine the effect of divided attention on emotion-induced memory trade-off, a 
valence (positive, negative) x attention (full attention, divided attention) ANOVA was 
conducted.  The memory trade-off scores were used in this Experiment, just as in Experiment 1. 
This ANOVA revealed no significant effects (all F<2.5, p>.1).  
Item and background memory for positive, negative and neutral items was also examined 
to see if memory for emotional items was consistent with previous studies conducted using 
divided attention paradigms that did not examine the emotion-induced memory trade-off. A 
scene component type (item, background) x emotion (positive, negative, neutral) x attention (full 
attention, divided attention) ANOVA was conducted.  This ANOVA revealed a main effect of 
divided attention, F(1,41) = 34.171, p < .001, ηP2 = .455, such that there was better memory 
under the full attention condition than the divided attention condition, t(41) = 5.846, p < .001.  
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There was also a main effect of emotion F(1,41) = 5.329, p < .01, ηP2 = .115 and a main 
effect of scene component type F(1,41) = 107.75, p < .001, ηP2 = .724, that was qualified by a 
scene component type x emotion interaction F(2,82) = 4.734, p < .01, ηP2 = .104.  There was 
significantly better memory for positive, t(41) = 4.416, p < .001 and negative, t(41) = 3.287 p < 
.01 items than neutral, but there were no significant differences in memory between the 
backgrounds that had been paired with these items (all t < 1.5, p > .2) 
Discussion. The goal of Experiment 2 was to examine the effect of limiting attentional 
resources on the emotion-induced memory trade-off for positive and negative information. I 
found that the effect of dividing attention at encoding did not influence the emotion-induced 
memory trade-off. Item memory did remain stronger for emotional items as compared to neutral 
items, even under divided attention. This is consistent with some studies which have suggested 
that there is greater memory for negative items than neutral event items even when divided 
attention (Harris & Pashler, 2005; Hulse, et al., 2007).  Other divided attention studies have 
found that dividing attention may actually be less likely to decrease memory for negative items 
than that of positive or neutral information (Kern et al., 2005; Talmi et al., 2007). However, the 
current study did not find this emotion x attention interaction. Further, none of these prior studies 
considered the effect of divided attention on the emotion-induced memory trade-off. The lack of 
modulation of the trade-off under divided attention may suggest that participants are just as 
likely to have enhanced item memory and decreased background memory when attentional 
resources are compromised, as when they have more resources available.  
As this is a null result, there is still the possibility that if even less attentional resources 
were available, the memory trade-off would have been modified. However, if this effect is true, 
it may indicate that the amount of attentional resources available is not what drives the memory 
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trade-off. Perhaps even under divided attention, post-stimulus elaboration may be increased for 
emotional items. This may be what is driving the memory trade-off. This idea is contrary to the 
previous assertions that have linked the Easterbrook hypothesis (1959) to the memory trade-off, 
suggesting that arousal induces focused attention which leads to the memory trade-off. Even if 
emotional arousal may lead to more focused attention, this does not seem to be what is driving 
the memory trade-off. 
General Discussion 
The effect of attention on the emotion-induced memory trade-off was examined by 
looking at the effects of eye gaze at encoding, attentional disengagement, and divided attention. 
These investigations revealed that the amount of overt visual attention does not explain why 
selective item memory occurs more for emotional items than neutral items. Further, dividing 
attention in the current study did not affect the emotion-induced memory trade-off. Other factors 
besides attention that may influence the memory trade-off are discussed below. 
 Though most studies on the emotion-induced memory trade-off have assumed that the 
emotion-induced memory trade-off is driven by focused attention, Christianson (1992) suggested 
that in addition to attention, post-stimulus elaboration should be considered as another possible 
influence on the emotion-induced memory trade-off. The basis of the claim that post-stimulus 
elaboration may be one factor driving the memory trade-off rests upon the levels of processing 
framework (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). This framework suggests that people remember 
information better when it is processed at a deep level, with reference to the meaning of the 
information.  Emotional information may be more likely to be elaborated upon in a deeper 
fashion than non-emotional information, and this may lead to enhanced memory for the 
emotional information.  For example, Heuer & Reisberg (1990) found that participants thought 
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more about emotional events than non-emotional events. Further, they were more likely to think 
about emotional events in a deep, personally relevant way, while neutral events were thought 
about in a more abstract, shallow manner. Based on these data, Christianson (1992) suggested 
that perhaps the enhanced elaboration that goes on after the encoding of emotional items (as 
opposed to non-emotional items or backgrounds) may lead to this trade-off in memory for 
emotional items and peripheral contexts.  The importance of elaboration in the emotional 
memory enhancement effects has been discussed in a number of studies (e.g., Hamann, 2001; 
Harris & Pashler, 2005; Libkuman, et al., 2004; Schmidt & Saari, 2007). However, the 
hypothesis that post-stimulus elaboration is driving the memory trade-off has not yet been 
systematically studied.  
In the Attentional Disengagement Condition, post-stimulus elaboration was increased for 
both items and backgrounds: when people answered true/false questions they were forced to 
think more deeply for both the item and background data. If post-stimulus elaboration was 
indeed a factor in influencing the emotion-induced memory trade-off, one would expect there to 
be no memory trade-off under the Attentional Disengagement Condition. This was what 
happened in the current study. When considering item and background memory separately, there 
was not a decrement in background memory for backgrounds that were paired with emotional 
scenes under the Attentional Disengagement Condition.  
Lastly, there was no evidence that the memory trade-off was enhanced when attentional 
resources were limited. One may have expected that if attention was the main factor in the 
emotion-induced memory trade-off that divided attention would have lead to a more narrow 
focus on the emotional information and an increased emotion-induced memory trade-off. This 
was not the case under this particular divided attention manipulation. As this is a null result, 
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more research is needed to fully understand the effects of limiting attention on the emotion-
induced memory trade-off.  However, if these results are true, it provides further evidence for the 
suggestion that attention is not what is driving the memory trade-off. Even when attentional 
resources are limited, individuals may engage more post-stimulus elaboration for the emotional, 
but not the neutral items.  
It is also important to highlight the two different measures of attention in Experiment 1 
and Experiment 2. While eye-tracking in Experiment 1 provided a measure of overt visual 
attention, dividing attention in Experiment 2 was influenced by central executive resources and 
the demands of task coordination. These different measures provide complementary pieces of 
evidence. Though we saw that cognitive control abilities could be used to dampen the memory 
trade-off, the trade-off was not enhanced when these cognitive control abilities were taxed. 
Together, these two experiments suggest that there may be factors other than attention that 
influence the memory trade-off. 
Appendix A 
To consider the effect of recollection, for Experiment 2, an ANOVA Valence (positive, 
negative) x Attention (full attention, divided attention) was conducted. This analysis revealed a 
main effect of valence, F(1,41) = 4.704, p<.05, ηP2 = .103 such that there was a greater trade-off 
for negative scenes than for positive scenes, t(41) = 2.169, p<.05. For items that were vividly 
recollected, there was a greater trade-off for negative scenes than for positive scenes. Perhaps 
there was greater post-encoding processing for negative items than for positive ones, leading 
positive items to be remembered with more details. Though we now know that attention does not 
predict the trade-off, this pattern of results is consistent with the literature that suggests that 
negative information and negative moods may focus attention while positive information may 
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broaden it (Anderson, 2005; Fredrickson, & Branigan, 2005; Gasper, 2004; Gasper & Clore, 
2002; Rowe, Hirsh & Anderson, 2007).  
Interestingly, there was still a significant trade-off for the positive items. People 
remembered the positive item significantly more than the background as compared to neutral. 
However, even though participants may be more likely to have broader attention for positive 
information than for negative, other factors such as post-stimulus elaboration may still lead to the 
emotion-induced memory trade-off. 
CHAPTER 2: EFFECTS OF ANXIETY ON THE MEMORY TRADE-OFF 
Trait anxiety refers to a general pattern of anxiousness over time (Eppley, Abrams, & 
Shear, 1989). There have been mixed results regarding memory for emotional information in 
individuals with high trait anxiety. While some studies suggest that people with high trait anxiety 
may exhibit superior memory for threatening information rather than non-threatening 
information when compared to low anxiety individuals (Byrne & Eysenck, 1995; Nugent & 
Mineka, 1994; Reidy & Richards, 1997), other studies have not found evidence of this bias 
(Dalgleish, 1994; Oldenburg, Lundh, & Kivisto, 2002; Richards & French, 1991). In addition, 
most of the previous literature has focused on memory for threatening information. Thus, it is 
unclear if these memory biases are specific to threatening information or if they extend to other 
types of negative information, positive information, and low arousal information. The goal of the 
current study is to 1) determine how trait anxiety affects the memory trade-off for stimuli that 
vary by valence and arousal, and 2) determine if people with high levels of trait anxiety are able 
to dampen the memory trade-off when it is task relevant.  
 Part of the reason for the mixed emotional memory findings in individuals with high trait 
anxiety could be because anxiety may be more likely to affect the quality of the emotional 
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memory as opposed to the quantity of emotional stimuli that are remembered. One way to 
consider the qualitative subcomponents of recognition memory is by looking at recollection and 
familiarity (Inaba & Ohira, 2009). Previous studies have found that people may either base 
recognition judgments on recollection of specific previous study events, or simply on stimulus 
familiarity (see Yonelinas, 2002 for review).   
Anxiety may be especially likely to affect the qualitative nature of memory. Even in the 
absence of overall group differences, it has been suggested that attentional differences in people 
with high anxiety may lead to differences in recollection and familiarity for positive and negative 
information. Previous studies have shown that people with high levels of anxiety have difficulty 
discriminating negative or threatening items (Amir & Kozak, 2002; Kverno, 2000; Nugent & 
Mineka, 1994). In other words, people with high levels of trait anxiety may have a bias to say 
“old” for negative information. This difficulty in discriminating old from new negative 
information may come from relying more on familiarity-based processes than recollection-based 
processes to recognize negative information (Amir & Kozak, 2002; Kverno, 2000). This suggests 
that increased recognition memory for negative information may be primarily due to familiarity 
in high anxiety individuals (Inaba & Ohira, 2009).  
On the other hand, some studies have shown that anxiety may be more likely to affect 
recall memory than recognition memory (Mitte, 2008). Since recall draws upon recollective 
processes, it has also been proposed that enhanced memory for negative information in high 
anxiety individuals may be more likely to be an effect of recognition-based processes. Thus, 
though anxiety likely affects the qualitative nature of emotional memories, it is unclear if 
recollection or familiarity processes would be affected more. The current study seeks to examine 
the effect of valence and arousal on the memory trade-off in high and low trait anxious 
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individuals when recollection and familiarity are considered. 
 Another possible explanation for the mixed trait anxiety memory results is that people 
with higher levels of anxiety may be more likely to remember the emotional parts, but forgetting 
surrounding details, thus exhibit a greater memory trade-off than those with low anxiety.  As 
mentioned in the introduction, this could lead to seemingly contrary findings in the literature 
based on the type of stimuli that are studied.  People with high levels of anxiety may do better 
than those with low anxiety on memory tests that focus on the emotional item, but not have this 
bias when background information in emotional pictures is tested.  
In support of the hypothesis that the memory trade-off may be enhanced in individuals 
with high anxiety, one study found that the level of anxiety in a sub-clinical population was 
correlated with the magnitude of the memory trade-off effect (Waring, et al., 2010).  In other 
words, people with higher levels of anxiety were more likely to remember the emotional 
component of a scene but forget the neutral background. The first goal of this chapter is to 
determine if people with high levels of anxiety are more likely to have an enhanced memory 
trade-off for different types of emotional stimuli as compared to those with low levels of anxiety, 
when recollection and familiarity are considered. 
The memory biases that have been found for threatening information have been explained 
by the fact that individuals with high levels of anxiety may be more likely to attend to 
threatening information and may have more difficulty disengaging their attention from 
threatening information than individuals with lower anxiety (e.g, Derryberry, & Reed, 2002; 
Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos & Calvo, 2007; Yiend & Mathews, 2001).  This difficulty in 
disengaging attention may be due to an inability to use cognitive control to inhibit attention to 
threat-related distracters (Bishop, Duncan, Brett & Lawrence, 2004; Eyesenck, 1997). The 
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second goal of the current chapter is to determine if people with high trait anxiety are able to 
dampen the memory trade-off when they are asked to process both items and backgrounds at 
encoding.  
 The current study investigates two key questions focusing on the impact of emotion type 
and attentional control on the memory trade-off. Experiment 1 is designed to determine the 
influence of valence and arousal on the memory trade-off for individuals with high and low 
anxiety. This study will help to determine if these anxiety-based memory biases impact the 
memory trade-off and if they are unique to negative and high arousal information or if the biases 
extend to other valence and arousal types. Experiment 2 will consider if individuals with high 
anxiety are able to disengage their attention to modulate the memory trade-off when it is task 
relevant to do so. This experiment will help to determine if the memory trade-off can be 
overridden in individuals with high anxiety. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. Fifty-two Boston College students (ages 18-22, 25 Men) were recruited for 
this study. Participants were divided into equal high and low anxiety groups using a median split 
according to a composite anxiety score which took into account the BAI score (Beck, et al., 
1988) and STAI score (Spielberger, et al., 1983). The low anxiety group included twenty-six 
participants (15 Males, anxiety M[SD] = 16 [4.88]) and the high anxiety group included twenty-
six participants (10 Males, anxiety M[SD] = 35.07 [13.72]). All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, were native English speakers, and had no history of a 
neuropsychological or psychiatric disorder.  No participant listed taking medications that affect 
the central nervous system.  
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  Materials and Procedures. Materials were the same as used in Experiment 2 of Chapter 
1 of this dissertation. However, a wider range of pictures were included in these analyses in order 
to look at differences for a variety of different arousal levels. The full stimulus set included 60 
pictures in each category for a total of 300 pictures. A slightly restricted group of pictures was 
used for the analyses in order to make sure that the positive and negative moderate arousal 
pictures were matched on arousal. Within each valence category (positive and negative), a 
median split by arousal was applied to yield a higher and lower arousal group. Valence was rated 
on a 9-point scale (with one being extremely negative and nine being extremely positive) and 
arousal was rated on a 5-point scale (with one being low in arousal and five being high in 
arousal) as described in Chapter 1. The valence ratings were collected in the current experiment 
while the arousal ratings were predetermined norms. The categories of stimuli included in the 
analyses were 60 negative high arousal pictures (valence = 3.27[1.48], arousal = 4.33 [0.39]), 55 
negative moderate arousal pictures (valence =3.98 [1.11], arousal = 3.15 [0.67]), 55 positive 
moderate arousal pictures (valence = 6.03 [0.99], arousal = 2.96 [0.57]), 60 positive low arousal 
pictures (valence =6.07 [1.30], arousal = 1.88 [0.37]) and 60 neutral (valence =5.31 [0.92], 
arousal = 2.35 [0.61]). Across all emotion categories, scenes were matched for visual 
complexity, congruency between item and background, and number of people, animals and 
buildings. 
The procedures were also identical to those of Chapter 1, Experiment 2: participants 
viewed composite pictures under full and divided attention.  For the current chapter, I will focus 
on the differences between high and low arousal stimuli for the full attention condition.  
 Data Analysis. Memory trade-off scores were calculated in the same manner as in 
Chapter 1. However, in the current study, “remember” and “know” responses were analyzed to 
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investigate whether anxiety affects memory specificity. For the “know” responses, independent 
know scores were used. These were calculated as [“Know” / (1- “Remember”)]. This accounts 
for the fact that the two response types were mutually exclusive, yielding the probability that an 
item received a “know” response given that it did not receive a “remember” response (Yonelinas 
& Jacoby, 1995) 
Results 
In order to determine the effect of valence and arousal on the emotion-induced memory 
trade-off a 4 x 2 ANOVA was conducted with the factors of emotion (negative high arousal, 
negative moderate arousal, positive moderate arousal, positive low arousal) and anxiety (high 
anxiety, low anxiety). This analysis revealed a main effect of emotion, F(3, 150) = 11.287, p < 
.001 ηP2 = .184 such that there was a larger memory trade-off for negative high arousing items 
than for any other category (positive moderate arousal, t(51) = 2.987, p <.01, positive low 
arousal, t(51) = 6.055, p <.01, and marginally larger than negative moderate arousal, t(51) = 
1.703, p <.1. Negative moderate arousal items had a larger memory trade-off than positive low 
arousal items, t(51) = 4.04, p<.01. Positive moderate arousal had a larger memory trade-off than 
positive low arousal items, t(51) = 2.753, p<.01. There was no emotion x anxiety interaction (all 
F < 1, p > .1). 
However, because anxiety may affect recollection and familiarity differently, I also 
conducted this emotion x anxiety ANOVA based on whether the participant had either had a 
vivid recollection of the item (“remember”) or had a sense of familiarity (independent “know”). 
The ANOVA conducted with recollection scores included the factors of emotion (negative high 
arousal, negative moderate arousal, positive moderate arousal, positive low arousal) and anxiety 
(high, low). This ANOVA revealed a main effect of emotion, F(3, 150) = 21.796, p <.001 ηP2 = 
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.304 that was similar to the pattern of the previous analysis when “remember” and “know” 
responses were combined (see Figure 4A). There was a larger memory trade-off for negative 
high arousal items as opposed to negative moderate arousal items, t(51) = 2.4, p <.05, positive 
moderate arousal items, t(51) = 3.784, p <.01, and positive low arousal items, t(51) = 5.471, p 
<.01. There was also a larger trade-off for negative moderate arousal items as opposed to 
positive moderate arousal items, t(51) = 1.937, p <.01 and positive low arousal items, t(51) = 
1.937, p <.01 and there was a greater trade-off for positive moderate arousal items as opposed to 
positive low arousal items, t(51) = 3.886, p <.01. 
When only items that were “known” with a sense of familiarity were included in the 
ANOVA, both a main effect of emotion, F(3, 150) = 3.423, p<.05 ηP2 =.064 and an emotion x 
anxiety interaction, F(3, 150) = 3.33, p<.05 ηP2 =  .062 emerged (see Figure 4B). There was a 
higher memory trade-off for high anxiety individuals than low anxiety individuals for negative 
high arousal items, t(50) = 2.079, p <.05. 
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Discussion 
When overall memory was considered, the largest memory trade-off occurred for high 
arousal items. This is consistent with previous studies which have suggested that high arousal 
items may be especially likely to influence the memory trade-off (Waring & Kensinger, 2009; 
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Waring & Kensinger, under review). This is also consistent with predictions that high arousal 
may narrow attention, leading to an enhanced memory trade-off (Easterbrook, 1959; Reisberg & 
Heuer, 2004), though attention narrowing may not lead to the enhancement of the memory trade-
off (see Chapter 1). Arousal may also increase other processes such as post-stimulus elaboration, 
which may have led to the increase in the trade-off for high arousal items. Interestingly, when 
arousal was matched (for the positive and negative moderate arousal items) there was no effect 
of valence. This may indicate that arousal may have a greater effect on the memory trade-off 
than valence when recognition and familiarity are collapsed. 
 Recollection and familiarity were then considered separately in order to determine if 
there was a qualitative difference in memory between anxiety groups.  Whenever only 
recollection was considered, there was a similar pattern as the collapsed data, with no anxiety 
interaction and an enhancement in the memory trade-off for arousing items. However, one 
difference from the collapsed trade-off scores was the effect of valence. The positive and 
negative items that were matched on arousal did differ in the strength of the memory trade-off. 
There was a greater memory trade-off for the negative moderate arousal scenes than the positive 
moderate arousal scenes. As mentioned in Chapter 1, there is some evidence that negative 
information may be more likely to be elaborated upon than positive information (Talmi et al., 
2007). If participants did indeed engage in more post-stimulus elaboration processes for negative 
information than positive information, this may have been reflected in the effect of recollection. 
This effect may not have been strong enough to affect overall memory, but may have played a 
role in the amount of detail remembered for negative information. In other words, people may 
have been more likely to vividly “remember” negative information, and less likely to vividly 
remember the accompanying backgrounds than for positive information. 
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 When familiarity was considered we did see an interaction with anxiety. For negative 
high arousal items there was a greater trade-off for individuals with high anxiety than those with 
low anxiety. This is consistent with studies that have suggested that individuals with high anxiety 
may be more likely to remember negative and high arousal information specifically (Bar-Haim et 
al., 2007). It is also consistent with the suggestion that this memory enhancement for negative 
items may be due to more familiarity-based processes (Amir & Kozak, 2002; Kverno, 2000). 
 The original motivation of this chapter focused on the idea that the memory trade-off 
would be driven by attention. Thus, Experiment 2 was set up in order to determine if there would 
be differences in high or low anxiety individuals’ ability to disengage attention. However, we 
discovered in Chapter 1 that attention does not predict the memory trade-off. Given this 
knowledge, Experiment 2 will now help to explain the influence of anxiety on the memory trade-
off when participants’ attention is guided by asking true/false questions at encoding. 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants. Fifty-three Boston College students (ages 18-22, 25 Men) were recruited 
for this study. As in Experiment 1, participants were divided into a high and low anxiety group 
using a median split according to a composite anxiety score which took into account the BAI 
score (Beck, et al., 1988) and STAI score (Spielberger, et al., 1983). The median score was 
twenty-one. Since there were four people with a score of twenty-one they were all included in 
the low anxiety group. This left twenty-eight participants (15 Males, anxiety M[SD] = 14.25 
[5.37]) in the low anxiety group and twenty-five participants (10 Males, anxiety M[SD] = 35.72 
[11.53]) in the high anxiety group. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, 
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were native English speakers, and had no history of a neuropsychological or psychiatric disorder.  
No participant listed taking medications that affect the central nervous system.  
  Materials and Procedures. Materials were the same as used in Experiment 1 of Chapter 
1 of this dissertation. The procedures are also identical: participants viewed composite pictures 
under passive viewing or Attentional Disengagement Conditions (where true/false questions 
were asked about the item and the background). For the current chapter, I will focus on the 
behavioral effects for the view and the Attentional Disengagement Condition.  
 Data Analysis. Memory trade-off scores were calculated in the same manner as 
Experiment 1 of this chapter. 
Results 
To determine the effect of valence, attentional disengagement and anxiety on the memory 
trade-off an emotion (positive, negative) x attentional disengagement (view, disengagement) x 
anxiety (high anxiety, low anxiety) ANOVA was conducted. This ANOVA revealed a main 
effect of attentional disengagement, F(1, 51) = 8.431, p <.01, ηP2 = .142 such that there was a 
larger trade-off for the view as opposed to the disengagement condition. 
To further explore these effects based on recollection and familiarity, this 2x2x2 
ANOVA was also conducted for “remembered” and “known” items separately (see Figure 5A). 
For recollection, this analysis revealed a disengagement x anxiety interaction, F(1, 51) = 9.266, p 
<.01, ηP2 = .154. While people with high anxiety have a larger trade-off than low anxiety under 
the Attentional Disengagement Condition, t(51) = 2.152, p<.05, that is not the case for the view 
condition. In fact, under the view condition there was a marginally significant effect indicating a 
larger trade-off for low anxiety as opposed to high anxiety individuals, t (51) = 1.745, p<.09. 
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For familiarity, this analysis revealed a marginal main effect of attentional 
disengagement, F (1, 40) = 3.203, p<.09, ηP2 = .074 such that there was a numerically larger 
trade-off for the view than the Attentional Disengagement Condition, though this t-test did not 
reach significance, t < 1.5, p > .15, see Figure 5B. There was also a significant main effect of 
emotion, F(1,40) = 5.391, p<.05, ηP2 = .119 which was qualified by an emotion x anxiety 
interaction, F(1,40) = 4.813, p<.05, ηP2 = .107. There was a larger trade-off for negative items 
than positive items for low anxiety individuals, t(26) = 2.339, p <.05, but there was no difference 
based on valence for high anxiety individuals (t<.5, p >.5).  
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Discussion 
When recollection and familiarity were collapsed, there were larger trade-offs for the 
view condition than the Attentional Disengagement Condition. Thus, we see a similar effect as 
found in Chapter 1 even when high anxiety individuals are considered. When recollection and 
familiarity were considered, just as in Experiment 1 we find differences depending on anxiety. 
For recollection, people with higher anxiety have a higher trade-off than low anxiety individuals 
during the Attentional Disengagement Condition. In other words, individuals with low anxiety 
are more successful at dampening the trade-off. This is consistent with studies that have 
indicated that individuals with high levels of anxiety may have lesser cognitive control abilities 
than individuals with low levels of anxiety (Bishop, et al., 2004; Eyesenck, 1997). Perhaps 
people with high levels of anxiety are less likely to be able to override the impulse to elaborate 
only on the emotional information.  
Indeed, level of cognitive control ability has been shown to be negatively correlated with 
the memory trade-off (Waring et al., 2010). Older adults who typically have lower levels of 
cognitive control abilities may have difficulty dampening the tradeoff when it is task relevant 
(Kensinger, Gutchess, et al., 2007). This anxiety difference may be especially revealed when 
items are vividly recollected because this increased post-stimulus elaboration may lead to vivid 
recollection of details about the negative items for the high trait anxiety individuals. 
For familiarity, there was also an interaction with anxiety. This analysis revealed an 
effect of valence that was present in individuals with low anxiety but not high anxiety. While 
low anxiety individuals had a larger trade-off for negative scenes than positive scenes, high 
anxiety individuals had an equally high trade-off regardless of valence. It is difficult to determine 
what might have caused this effect, as little research has focused on anxiety differences in post-
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stimulus elaboration.  However, it is possible that for the high anxiety group, the trade-off was 
driven by recollective memory for negative information. For the low anxiety individuals, 
familiarity may allow for more of an equalization of the trade-off between valences, leading to 
no valence differences when recollection and familiarity are not considered separately. 
General Discussion 
 Taken together these studies indicate that the effects of anxiety are most likely to be 
revealed in the memory trade-off when recollection and familiarity are considered separately. In 
Experiment 1 where arousal levels were manipulated, we saw that the trade-off was strongest for 
high arousal items. Thus, arousal may play a greater role in modulating the magnitude of the 
memory trade-off than valence. 
Unexpectedly, the effect of valence differed between the experiments when recollection 
and familiarity were considered.  For recollection, there was a significant effect of valence such 
that there was a larger trade-off for negative as opposed to positive items matched on arousal. 
However, this was not the case for Experiment 2. There was no valence effect for recollection. 
For familiarity in Experiment 2, there was a larger trade-off for negative as opposed to positive 
items, but only for low anxiety individuals. In Experiment 1 when familiarity was considered, 
there was a numerical trend such that there was a larger trade-off for negative as opposed to 
positive items for low anxiety individuals. Perhaps, adding the additional trials in the Experiment 
2 added the strength needed to make this effect significant. Though these results seem to suggest 
that there are differences in the trade-off for positive and negative information when recollection 
and familiarity are considered, these inconsistent results provide avenues for future research in 
order to determine what might be driving possible valence differences in the memory trade-off. 
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 The current study also found that anxiety was more likely to influence familiarity when 
the memory trade-off is considered. It has been suggested that anxiety may influence recollection 
more because anxiety is more likely to influence recall than recognition memory (Mitte, 2008).  
Thus, one might assume that anxiety would affect recollection more than familiarity. However, 
within the current memory trade-off paradigm, which is based upon a recognition memory test, 
anxiety differences emerged more under the familiarity condition. Others have suggested that 
individuals with high levels of anxiety may have a bias to say that negative information is 
familiar (Amir & Kozak, 2002; Inaba & Ohira, 2009; Kverno, 2000). The current studies did not 
find this bias. However, these studies provide evidence that familiarity responses may be 
affected by anxiety even in the absence of a negative familiarity bias. Future research is needed 
to determine how anxiety may lead to differences in recollection and familiarity. 
In sum, the current study revealed that high levels of arousal enhance the memory trade-
off. This enhancement may be especially strong in high anxiety individuals when this 
information is negative and arousing and when it is remembered with familiarity. Further, when 
recollection is considered, individuals with higher levels of anxiety are less likely to be able to 
disengage their attention to modulate the memory trade-off even when it is task relevant to attend 
to background information. These findings suggest that anxiety may modulate the strength of the 
memory trade-off. Further, anxiety may also affect the ability to modulate this strength when it is 
task relevant.  
CHAPTER 3: EFFECTS OF PTSD ON THE MEMORY TRADE-OFF 
Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is an anxiety disorder that develops in response to a 
traumatic event (Breslau, 2002). PTSD is characterized by differences in memory and attention 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Individuals with PTSD have difficulty concentrating 
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on or attending to neutral stimuli, while at the same time exhibiting hypervigilance, or increased 
sensitivity to detecting threat (see Vasterling & Brewin, 2005).  People with PTSD also exhibit 
involuntary re-experiencing of their trauma (flashbacks) despite intentionally avoiding stimuli 
associated with the trauma.   
Though PTSD is defined by these cognitive changes in regards to the involuntary memory 
for a traumatic incident (APA, 2000), few studies have explored if there are also differences that 
extend to voluntary memory. Most studies that have looked at voluntary memory have looked at 
changes in memory for the traumatic event (as opposed to more general emotional memory). 
These studies have yielded mixed results as to whether people with PTSD remember stimuli that 
are related to their trauma better than people who have experienced trauma but do not have 
PTSD.  
Some studies have found that when participants are asked to freely recall trauma-related and 
non-trauma-related words that were embedded in an attentional task (such as an emotional 
Stroop task), people with PTSD remember proportionally more traumatic words than do non-
patient controls (Chemtob et al., 1999; Kaspi, McNally, & Amir, 1995; Vrana, Roodman, & 
Beckman, 1995).  Although one interpretation of these findings is that PTSD enhances memory 
for trauma-related words, an important caveat is that these studies did not report the occurrence 
of false positives (i.e., reporting trauma words that were not presented in the Stroop task). Thus, 
it is difficult to determine if the increased free recall for trauma words reflected a response bias 
rather than a difference in memory accuracy.  Litz et al. (1996) found that in recognition memory 
tests, people with PTSD did not exhibit an increase in memory discrimination for trauma-related 
words, but instead showed an increased bias to say that they have seen trauma words, regardless 
	   52	  
of whether they were previously presented.  Therefore, it is currently unclear whether PTSD 
enhances memory accuracy for trauma-related words or has an effect on response bias. 
Another alternate explanation is that PSTD patients may show differential enhancement 
in memory for words related to their own trauma as compared to non-trauma words because they 
are particularly bad at remembering non-trauma words instead of being particularly good at 
remembering trauma words.  Indeed, studies have shown that PTSD patients have memory 
deficits for non-trauma-related words (Golier, Yehuda, Lupien & Harvey, 2003; McNally, 
Metzger, Lasko, Clancy & Pitman, 1998; Paunovic, Lundh & Ost, 2002). Thus, people with 
PTSD may simply be less impaired in their memory for trauma-relevant stimuli than in their 
memory for trauma-irrelevant stimuli.  
Paunovic et al. (2002) found that while crime victims with PTSD were equally as likely 
as people without PTSD to recognize faces that were perceived as threatening, they were less 
likely than people without PTSD to recognize non-hostile faces. These studies taken together 
indicate that there may not be a quantitative benefit for trauma related stimuli in people with 
PTSD than those without PTSD, though more systematic research is necessary to strengthen this 
claim. 
Though most of these studies have focused on voluntary memory for stimuli related to 
the trauma, few studies have looked at differences in memory for emotional information that is 
not related to the trauma. Most studies that have looked beyond trauma-related stimuli have 
focused on memory for fear stimuli. The majority of these studies have found no particular 
enhancement in memory for fear stimuli in people with PTSD than in those without PTSD (e.g., 
Bremner, et al., 2003; Dickie, Brunet, Akerib, & Armony, 2008).  Even fewer studies have 
looked at memory differences in PTSD for other types of negative stimuli, though one study that 
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looked at negative stimuli did not find group differences (Brohawn, Offringa, Pfaff, Hughes & 
Shin, 2010). Thus, more research is necessary to fully understand the extent of the differences in 
negative emotional memory in people with PTSD. 
Most studies have also not considered memory for positive information in individuals 
with PTSD. As one of the symptoms of PTSD is emotional numbness to positive stimuli, it is 
possible that people with PTSD may experience changes in memory for positive information 
(Jatzko, Schmitt, Demirakca, Weimer, & Braus, 2006). Very few studies have examined memory 
for positive information in individuals with PTSD. Brohawn, et al. (2010) tested memory for 
positive, negative, and neutral images in individuals with and without PTSD. However, for this 
study the positive images were significantly less arousing than the negative images. This study 
found that there was no difference between memory for positive and neutral images for both the 
PTSD and the non-PTSD group. Since the pictures were not matched on arousal, this study 
suggests that positive valence alone does not lead to altered memory in PTSD. However, those 
results cannot speak to potential differences in memory for positive images that are also high in 
arousal.  
Another study examined memory for positive information in people with acute stress 
disorder, finding that there was no difference in memory for positive information between people 
with and without PTSD (Paunovic, et al., 2002). Acute stress disorder is a similar diagnosis to 
PTSD, except that acute stress disorder is circumscribed to the first four weeks after a traumatic 
event whereas PTSD is longer lasting (APA, 2000). Therefore, the performance of patients with 
acute stress disorder is likely to be similar to the performance of patients with PTSD. However, 
in Paunovic and colleague’s study, positive items were not matched on arousal level with 
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negative items, and false alarms were not measured. Thus, it is still an open question as to how 
PTSD would affect memory for positive stimuli.  
No study has looked at memory for positive information that is properly matched in 
arousal in PTSD. The lack of research on differences in memory for positive and negative 
emotional stimuli leaves many open questions about the extent of the differences in people with 
PTSD. The first goal of the present study is to consider differences in item memory for 
emotional items in individuals with PTSD. 
Despite the confusion surrounding these quantitative differences in emotional memory, 
people with PTSD have consistently reported qualitative differences in their memory for their 
trauma.  These qualitative differences provide a clue as to what deficits may appear in voluntary 
emotional memory in individuals with PTSD. Trauma memories in people with PTSD are often 
cited as being fragmented (i.e., disjointed and disorganized, with missing pieces of information; 
Foa, Molnar, & Cashman, 1995; Halligan, et al., 2003; Nijenhuis & van der Hart, 1999; Tromp, 
et al., 1995; van der Hart, Van der Kolk, & Boon, 1998; van der Kolk and Fisler, 1995; but see 
Berntsen, Rubin, & Bohni, 2008 for evidence against fragmentation in PTSD). In addition, 
anecdotally, patients with PTSD often report “tunnel memory,” or a detailed memory for the 
emotional element or gist of the scene without much memory for the surrounding elements or 
contextual details (LaBar, 2007).  For example, someone with PTSD might have a vivid memory 
of a body in combat, but they may not remember the details of where the body was found.  
This “fragmentation,” resulting in a memory that has missing pieces of information, may 
also be caused in part by similar mechanisms that evoke memory trade-offs in those individuals 
without PTSD. Higher anxiety levels and lower levels of cognitive control (e.g., lower ability to 
manage other cognitive processes, leading to poorer ability to plan, think abstractly, etc.) have 
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been correlated with a stronger memory trade-off (Waring et al., 2010).  Because those who 
develop PTSD tend to have higher levels of anxiety and lower levels of cognitive control than 
those who do not develop PTSD (see van der Kolk, 2004), it would make sense that people with 
PTSD may show more of a trade-off.   
However, the magnitude of the trade-off effect has not been systematically tested in a 
population with PTSD, and so the validity of this hypothesis is unknown.  The second goal of the 
current study is to determine if there are differences in the magnitude of the memory trade-off for 
individuals with PTSD. 
Methods 
Participants 
Sixty-nine individuals were recruited via postings on the Internet, throughout the 
community, and at a local trauma center. Presence of PTSD was determined by diagnosis on the 
Structured Clinician Interview for the DSM-IV (SCID; First, Spitzer, Williams, & Gibbon, 
1995), by a qualified clinician. Experience of trauma was determined by the SCID and the DSM-
IV criteria. Of the sixty-nine individuals recruited for the study, 52 were used in the analysis. 
Ten participants were excluded from analysis because they had never experienced trauma, two 
were excluded due to psychotic disorders, one for current alcohol dependence, and three were 
excluded for failure to complete the second part of the study. Twenty-five participants met 
criteria for current PTSD (PTSD group, 8 Males), and twenty-seven had undergone trauma but 
did not meet criteria for current PTSD (non-PTSD, 14 Males). None of these 52 participants had 
a psychotic disorder or current alcohol or substance dependence. The groups did not differ on 
age or education level (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Type of trauma and comorbidities for each participant. 
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Participants Sex Trauma Comorbidity 
PTSD Group    
1 F Sexual assault MDD, GAD, BED 
2 M Family tragedy None 
3 M Physical assault GAD 
4 M Sexual assault MDD, GAD 
5 F Psychological abuse MS, MDD, PD, 
Pho. 6 F Arrest None 
7 M Physical assault None 
8 F Family tragedy Pho 
9 M Physical and psychological abuse None 
10 F Physical and sexual assault MDD, Pho, OCD 
11 M Psychological abuse MDD 
12 F Sexual assault MDD, PD 
13 F Physical and sexual assault None 
14 F Physical abuse None 
15 F Sexual assault Epi, MDD 
16 F Sexual assault None 
17 F Family tragedy None 
18 F Physical assault MDD, PD, OCD 
19 F Captivity None 
20 M Sexual assault MDD 
21 F Sexual assault None 
22 F Physical and psychological abuse Epi 
23 F Family tragedy None 
24 F Physical, sexual, psychological abuse None 
25 M Physical and psychological abuse BPD, BED 
Non-PTSD 
Group 
   
26 M Car accident BPD, SP, OCD 
27 M Family tragedy Pho 
28 M Witnessed death Pho, BED 
29 M Captivity None 
30 M Car accident Epi 
31 F Physical assault Pho 
32 M Physical assault Pho 
33 F Sexual assault None 
34 M Car accident None 
35 F Sexual abuse, captivity MDD, Pho 
36 M Car accident None 
37 F Physical assault PD 
38 M Physical assault None 
39 F Car accident None 
40 M Arrest None 
41 M Family tragedy GAD 
42 M Physical assault BPD 
43 F Family tragedy None 
44 M Arrest GAD 
45 M Physical assault  GAD 
46 F Car accident None 
47 F Family tragedy None 
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48 F Physical and psychological abuse MDD, Dys 
49 F Sexual abuse None 
50 F Physical assault None 
51 F Witnessed death Dys 
52 F Physical and psychological abuse Dys 
MDD=Major Depressive Disorder; GAD=Generalized Anxiety Disorder; BED =Binge Eating 
Disorder; PD=Panic Disorder; Pho=Phobia; OCD=Obsessive Compulsive Disorder; 
Epi=Epilepsy; BPD=Bipolar Disorder; Alc=Alcohol Dependence; Dys=Dysthymic Disorder 
 
Stimuli 
The stimuli were the same as described in previous chapters.  There were 60 positive 
images (mean valence = 6.02, SE = .81), 60 negative images (mean valence = 3.80, SE = .82) and 
60 neutral images (mean valence = 5.29, SE = .75).  Arousal (rated on a five point scale, with 
low numbers indicating soothing or subduing images and high numbers indicating exciting or 
agitating images) ratings were as follows: mean (SD): Positive = 3.02 (0.57); Negative= 3.19 
(0.66); Neutral = 2.35 (0.61)).  
Just as in previous chapters, the positive and negative images were matched on arousal 
and absolute valence (all p >.30) and neutral images were considered less arousing than both 
positive and negative images (all p <.05). Across emotion categories, scenes were matched for 
visual complexity, congruency between item and background, and number of people, animals 
and buildings. 
Stimuli were randomized to create two different study lists with 90 items per list (30 
negative, 30 positive and 30 neutral).  Those lists were then also presented in reverse order, 
yielding four total study lists that were counterbalanced across participants. It was never the case 
that more than three of the same emotion category appeared in a row. 
At test, composite scenes from the study sessions were broken down into the isolated 
item and background components and these two elements were shown independently in the 
recognition memory test.  The recognition memory test was also randomized for a total of four 
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test lists to make sure that there were not effects of placement of a certain picture in context to 
another picture. These test lists were counterbalanced across participants. In addition, which 
items and backgrounds were “old” vs. “new” were counterbalanced across participants based on 
the study list that they viewed. 
Procedure 
 Participants first filled out the consent form, a demographics questionnaire, an 
assessment of their state and trait anxiety (BAI; STAI-S and STAI-T) and an assessment of their 
depressive symptoms (BDI-II). 
 Participants then took part in an incidental encoding session. They were told that this first 
part of the study was designed to measure their reactions to emotional images.  During this 
session 90 pictures (30 from each emotion category) were shown on a white computer screen for 
5 seconds each. While viewing the scene, participants were asked to rate the picture’s valence on 
a 9-point scale, 9 being the most intensely positive and 1 being the most intensely negative.  
After 5 seconds were up, the participant was asked to press the space bar to move on to the next 
picture. Each participant completed a short practice version of the task before performing the 
actual task.  
After participants completed the encoding session, a variety of standardized cognitive 
tasks were administered, creating a retention delay of approximately 45 minutes: Rey–Osterrieth 
Complex Figure Test (Rey-O), Stroop Test, Backward Digit Span, FAS, Shipley Vocabulary, 
Digit Symbol, S.M.A.S.T. (Alcohol screening), Health Form. At this point participants were also 
given a 5-10 minute break. 
 During the unanticipated recognition testing phase, participants viewed items and 
backgrounds extracted separately from the studied composite scenes, as well as new items and 
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backgrounds (90 items and 90 backgrounds from the study list, 30 from each emotion category, 
and 90 new items and new backgrounds).  For each item or background, participants were asked 
to indicate whether they believed the picture was new, whether they “remembered” it 
(recollected specific details of its presentation during the encoding session) or “knew” it (felt a 
sense of familiarity with the picture, without remembering details from the encoding session). 
Participants underwent an extensive practice and instruction phase to ensure their understanding 
of remember vs. know ratings.  This test was self-paced and the slide moved on when 
participants had made their response. 
 After the test phase, participants were asked to fill out the PTSD checklist (PCL; 
Weathers, Litz, Herman, Huska & Keane, 1993) and the Life Events Checklist (Gray, Litz, Hsu, 
& Lombardo, 2004).  In a separate session, the presence of PTSD as well as other comorbid 
disorders were assessed using the SCID. The severity of memory problems surrounding the 
trauma was also assessed using selected questions from the clinician administered PTSD scale 
(CAPS). 
Data Analysis 
 The trade-off effect was calculated in the same manner as in Chapter 1.  
Results 
Participant Demographics and Cognitive Test Scores 
Groups did not differ on any socio-demographic level (see Table 2). However, the PTSD 
group did have higher scores for the scales measuring the severity of the PTSD (PCL), level of 
depression and anxiety (BDI-II, BAI, STAI-T), and one measure of visual memory (Rey-O 
delayed). Overall, males had higher Shipley vocabulary scores, t(50) = 2.254, p < .05 and a 
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higher age of trauma, t(47) = 2.313, p < .05 than females. Females had higher Beck Anxiety 
scores than men, t(50) = 2.741, p < .01. 
Table 2. Demographic, cognitive and psychopathological characteristics of the samples. 
ns = not significant 
Picture Ratings 
An analysis was conducted on the picture ratings at encoding in order to make sure that 
there were not differences in the way that the pictures were rated by the two different groups. 
These ratings were made on a nine-point scale, 1 being intensely negative and 9 being intensely 
positive. An emotion (positive, negative, neutral) x group (PTSD, non-PTSD) ANOVA was 
conducted. This analysis revealed a main effect of emotion, F(2,49) = 62.222, p < .001, but no 
  PTSD Non-PTSD Statistics   
  N=25 N=27     
Sex (Male/Female) (8/17) (14/13) χ2(1) = 1.23, ns  
Age (years) 39.8 (14.22) 41.78 (15.26) t(50) = .48, ns  
Years of Education 14.48 (3.25) 14.44 (2.44) t(50) = .05, ns  
Age of Trauma 20.76 (12.99) 26 (13.99) t(50) = 1.36, ns  
Years Since Trauma 17.04 (14.4) 16 (13.53) t(50) = .26, ns  
PCL 55.78 (13.04) 36.74 (13.62) t(50) = 5.14, p < .01 PTSD>Non 
BDI 20.24 (10.61) 11.89 (8.34) t(50) = 3.17, p < .01 PTSD>Non 
BAI 28.24 (10.72) 18.78 (14.39) t(50) = 2.67, p < .01 PTSD>Non 
STAI-T 53.26 (10.83) 42.33 (10.21) t(50) = 3.75, p < .01 PTSD>Non 
STAI-S 43.56 (11.78) 37.93 (12.84) t(50) = 1.65, ns  
FAS 45.28 (10.83) 39.59 (12.64) t(50) = 1.74, ns  
FAS perseverations 0.92 (1.29) 1.56 (2.98) t(50) = .98, ns  
Stroop_Word 96.4 (23.19) 97.07 (18.32) t(50) = .12, ns  
Stroop_X 68.88 (17) 65.7 (12.76) t(50) = .77, ns  
Stroop_Color 43.04 (14.46) 38.81 (9.34) t(50) = 1.25, ns  
Digit Symbol 36.16 (10.96) 34.15 (8.08) t(50) = .76, ns  
Digit Span Backward 7.24 (2.83) 6.26 (2.19) t(50) = 1.40, ns  
Shipley 31.04 (7.07) 28.33 (7.05) t(50) = 1.38, ns  
Rey-O Copy 34.4 (3.65) 33.56 (3.03) t(50) = .91, ns  
Rey-O Immediate 20.78 (7.09) 17.33 (6.3) t(50) = 1.86, ns  
Rey-O Delayed 21.54 (6.55) 16.35 (6.5) t(50) = 2.87, p < .01 PTSD>Non 
Rey-O Recognition 19.92 (1.74) 19.07 (1.75) t(50) = 1.72, ns  
SMAST 1.84 (2.51) 1.74 (2.6) t(50) = .14, ns  
CAPS Frequency 1.34 (1.25) 0.74 (1.29) t(50) = 1.59, ns  
CAPS Intensity 2 (1.8) 0.86 (1.55) t(50) = 2.24, p < .05 PTSD>Non 
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group effect or emotion x group interactions (all F < 1.5, p > 1.3). As expected, all valence types 
differed significantly from each other: Positive greater than negative: t(51) = 10.516, p < .001; 
Positive greater than neutral: t(51) = 7.852, p < .001; Neutral greater than negative t(51) = 7.363, 
p < .001. 
Memory Analyses 
To determine if there were overall memory differences that varied by emotion or group, 
separate ANCOVAs were conducted looking at item memory and background memory 
separately. These ANCOVAs included the factors of emotion3 (positive, negative, neutral) and 
Group (PTSD, non-PTSD) using the depression/anxiety and memory measures that differed 
between groups as covariates (BDI, BAI, STAI-T, and Rey-O delayed). Both ANCOVAs 
revealed no significant effects or interactions (F < 1.6, p > .2). 
 In order to determine differences in the emotion-induced memory trade-off a valence 
(positive, negative) x group (PTSD, non-PTSD) ANCOVA was conducted controlling for the 
same anxiety/depression and memory measures (see Figure 6). This analysis indicated a main 
effect of group; F(1, 46) = 5.239, p < .05, ηP2 = .102 such that there were larger memory trade-
off scores for the PTSD group than the non-PTSD group, t (50) = 2.669, p < .02. There was no 
significant effect of valence or any interactions (all F < .2, p > .6). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The factor of emotion for this ANCOVA included positive, negative and neutral items 
separately instead of the neutral difference scores used in the trade-off analyses. This was done 
to determine differences for each item type (not just differences in memory beyond that of 
neutral). However, analyses using positive and negative memory scores with a neutral baseline 
subtracted out revealed the same effects.	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Discussion 
  The current study sought to look at memory for positive and negative stimuli in people 
with and without PTSD. First, there were no group differences in memory for positive, negative 
or neutral items. This adds to the scarce, but growing, literature that indicates that visual 
emotional stimuli are remembered equally as well in people with PTSD as those without PTSD. 
Group differences did emerge when the emotion-induced memory trade-off was considered. For 
individuals with PTSD, there was a larger memory trade-off both for positive and negative 
stimuli. Thus, despite overall differences in item memory for emotional stimuli, people with 
PTSD showed more focused memory when an emotional item is present. 
When items and backgrounds were considered separately, there were no group 
differences in memory for emotional items. Previous studies that looked at memory for fear 
stimuli have also found that there are not particular memory enhancements for fear items in 
PTSD (Bremner, et al., 2003; Brohawn, et al., 2010; Dickie, et al., 2008). This study expands 
those findings to suggest that other types of negative and positive stimuli are also not enhanced 
for people with PTSD as compared to those without PTSD.  
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When considering overall item memory, one may have expected a determent in memory, 
such that even neutral stimuli would be less likely to be remembered in individuals with PTSD 
than those without PTSD. This was not the case. In fact, the only memory test in which 
participants differed between groups was the delayed component of the Rey–Osterrieth Complex 
Figure Test, in which participants draw a complex figure from memory after a 30-minute delay. 
For this test participants with PTSD actually performed better than those without PTSD. Thus, in 
the current study there was no evidence of a decrement in overall memory in people with PTSD. 
Though some studies have found an overall decrement in memory for neutral items (e.g., Golier, 
et al., 2003; McNally, et al., 1998; Paunovic, et al., 2002), others have not (e.g., Bremner, et al., 
2003; Brohawn, et al., 2010; Dickie, et al., 2008; Whalley et al., 2010). It is possible that I did 
not see the decrement in memory for neutral items because visual as opposed to verbal stimuli 
were used. A recent meta-analysis revealed that impairment in memory for neutral stimuli may 
be stronger for verbal than visual memory (Brewin, Kleiner, Vasterling, & Field, 2007). One 
account for this difference comes from the Dual Representation Theory (Brewin, 2001, 2003; 
Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996). According to this theory, people with PTSD have an intact 
visual memory system, allowing for vivid flashbacks and nightmares. However, it is the verbal 
system that is impaired, contributing to a disjointed, non-narrative based trauma memory. Thus, 
in the current study, it is possible that a higher functioning visual memory system may have 
contributed to the fact that there was no decrement in memory for the neutral complex visual 
scenes. This might also explain why the PTSD group did significantly better on the Rey–
Osterrieth Complex Figure Test, a test of visual memory. 
Group differences did emerge when the magnitude of the memory trade-off was 
considered. People with PTSD exhibited a larger memory trade-off than people without PTSD. 
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This memory trade-off is consistent with the symptoms of tunnel memory and memory 
fragmentation reported by some PTSD patients when remembering their trauma (e.g., Foa, et al., 
1995; Halligan, et al., 2003). The memory fragmentation that is exhibited in remembering the 
trauma may be part of an overall inability to bind contextual information to emotional 
information. 
This also indicates that though there might be fewer gross changes in item memory for 
positive and negative emotional items, there still may be differences in the increased focus of 
memory on emotional items. There could be multiple possible causes for this enhanced effect. 
People with PTSD are more likely to attend to emotional information and have more difficulty 
disengaging attention from emotional information (see Buckley, Blanchard, & Neill, 2000).  
However, the results of Chapter 1 indicate that attention does not predict the memory 
trade-off. People with PTSD also may have deficient cognitive control processes (see van der 
Kolk, 2004). This may lead to difficulties keeping both the item and background in mind after it 
has left the screen. In addition, people with PTSD also have more ruminative thought processes 
(Halligan, et al., 2003) and may be more likely to engage in post-encoding processing.  However, 
this increased rumination has typically been defined as dwelling on negative topics, thus it is 
unclear how post-encoding processing may function for positive information in individuals with 
PTSD. Future research should examine these potential causes for the increased memory trade-off 
in people with PTSD, especially for positive information. 
 This study is the first to reveal that, despite the lack of differences in overall memory for 
positive and negative items in those with and without PTSD, people with PTSD exhibit enhanced 
memory trade-offs for both positive and negative information. This indicates that there are more 
widespread memory changes in PTSD beyond that of the memory for the trauma, but these 
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changes are specific to difficulties encoding contextual elements presented with the emotional 
item.  
OVERALL DISCUSSION 
The studies discussed here added a number of new findings about the memory trade-off, 
and emotion’s influence on memory in general. First, though overt visual attention may play a 
role in what is remembered, it does not predict the selective memory benefit for emotional items 
(Chapter 1, Experiment 1). This adds to the understanding of the mechanism behind the memory 
trade-off because we now know that attention is not the main factor that drives the trade-off as 
previously assumed.  
Second, regardless of one’s level of trait anxiety, the memory trade-off is most influenced 
by arousal rather than by valence (Chapter 2, Experiment 1). The largest memory trade-offs 
appeared when remembering information from scenes that included a positive or negative high 
arousal item. Taken together, these findings add new information to the understanding of the 
memory trade-off and the effect of arousal on memory for emotional information.  
Though arousal may narrow attention in general (Easterbrook, 1953), it also may increase 
some other process that leads to the memory trade-off (such as increased post-encoding 
processing). These other processes may be the only things that are necessary for the memory 
trade-off to occur. On the other hand, the attention narrowing induced by high arousal may be 
necessary in combination with another process in order to induce the memory trade-off. Though 
the current study found no differences under divided attention, it is still unclear if some 
attentional resources are necessary for the trade-off. It could be that the memory trade-off exists 
even when attentional resources are exhausted or it could be that the divided attention task just 
did not engage enough attentional resources, leaving some attentional resources so that the trade-
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off still existed.  More research is needed to understand what all of the mechanisms are that 
influence the memory trade-off. 
I also found that the memory trade-off can be manipulated (Chapter 1, Experiment 2). 
When it was task relevant, participants with low anxiety were able to dampen the memory trade-
off. However, people with high levels of anxiety had more trouble dampening the memory trade-
off - at least for vividly recollected items - even when it was task relevant (Chapter 2, 
Experiment 2). In light of the results of Chapter 1, which suggest that attention is not the main 
factor that led to the memory trade-off, it may be that people with high levels of anxiety may 
continue to elaborate/ruminate on the emotional item, leading them to later recollect it. These 
post-encoding processes may also lead to greater trade-off for familiar items that are high in 
arousal.  
These effects of anxiety mapped onto the effects of the PTSD population in some ways. 
However, there were also distinct differences between trait anxiety and the anxiety disorder, 
PTSD.  For people with high levels of trait anxiety, the enhancements in the memory trade-off 
were only apparent when recollection and familiarity were considered separately. Thus, trait 
anxiety induced a more nuanced effect on the memory trade-off. For the anxiety disorder PTSD, 
the enhancements in the memory trade-off were apparent without considering recollection and 
familiarity. Further, this effect was present even when the anxiety measures used to determine 
the high trait anxiety group (STAI-T and BAI) were used as covariates. This suggests that there 
may be something unique to individuals with PTSD that causes this overall enhancement in the 
memory trade-off. This is important for our understanding of PTSD and its relationship to 
anxiety. While anxiety alone has many of the same features as PTSD, there are distinct 
differences that lead to overall enhancements in the memory trade-off.  
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Future directions 
Now that we know that attention at encoding may not be the main factor in inducing the 
memory trade-off, future research would do well to explore other factors.  In addition to the post-
stimulus elaboration which was mentioned earlier as a probable component, future research 
should explore the influences of consolidation and retrieval on the memory trade-off. While in 
my studies there was a 30-45 minute delay, longer delays (e.g., days to weeks) may influence the 
memory trade-off differently due to consolidation processes. Indeed, one recent study found that 
sleep over a consolidation period enhanced the memory trade-off (Payne et al., 2008). Thus, 
more research should be done to look beyond attention at encoding and determine how these 
other influences may affect the memory trade-off. 
Future research would also do well to consider stress’ role in the memory trade-off. I 
found that the more arousing an emotional stimulus , the more likely it was to induce the 
memory trade-off. However, a remaining question is whether stress would induce the memory 
trade-off even in the absence of an emotional stimuli. For example, would individuals who are 
experiencing arousal from psycho-social stress be more likely to have selective, more focused 
item memory for neutral items as well as emotional items? This research would help determine 
how physiological stress interacts with the encoding of emotional stimuli. This research would 
also speak to the current PTSD findings as people with PTSD have both experienced high levels 
of stress and also may have greater physiological reactions towards emotional stimuli. 
Conclusions 
The present experiments add to the current literature on 1) the effect of attention, 2) the 
effect of trait anxiety, and 3) the effect of PTSD on the memory trade-off. The results suggest 
that although the trade-off is enhanced in individuals with high anxiety and with PTSD, it may 
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be necessary to consider factors aside from attentional focusing in order to understand the 
prevalence of the trade-off in healthy individuals and in these clinically-relevant populations.  
Although most studies have assumed that attention at encoding was the main factor in inducing 
the memory trade-off, this research suggests that attention is not the main factor that induces the 
memory trade-off; other factors, such as post-stimulus elaboration or rehearsal, may play a role.  
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